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Agri-environmental schemes are the main policy instrument currently available in the EU to promote 
environmentally friendly farming practices. Nevertheless, the adoption rate of these measures is still 
limited. This paper develops a theoretical framework to explain farmer sign-up decision and tests 
whether factors affecting this decision differ depending on the level of requirement of each measure. 
The model is tested with two different AES in Spain implying a low and a high farm management 
change. Technical factors are found to be most relevant when significant farm practice changes are at 
stake while the role of farmer characteristics is significant when minor changes are required. In both 
cases, social capital and farmer attitudes still explain part of the sign-up decision. In order to increase 
adoption rates, different promotion activities should be undertaken according to different measures, 
increasing technical suitability when major changes are at stake and enhancing social capital and 
better targeting to relevant farmers for measures with lower requirements. 
 





Agri-environmental schemes (AES) are the main policy instrument currently available in the European 
Union to foster improvements in the relationship between agriculture and the environment. Over 35 
million hectares were under some kind of AES in EU-15 in 2003 with an overall 3.7 billion € in public 
funds being allocated annually to this policy and an overall expenditure of 14 billion € of EAGGF 
funds during the 2000-2006 period (DG AGRI, 2006). The degree of AES implementation varies 
widely among Member States both regarding the scope of measures designed and the proportion of 
UAA involved (Van Huylenbroeck and Whitby, 1999). While Austria, Finland and Luxembourg have 
more than two thirds of the UAA involved in agri-environmental measures; in Belgium, Denmark, 
Greece, the Netherlands and Spain the coverage is just a mere 5% of their total UAA (Glebe and 
Salhofer, 2007). 
 
Following Hanley et al. (1999) success or failure of agri-environmental policy should be evaluated 
combining both ecological and economic efficiency. Due to the uncertainty surrounding joint-
production relationships as well as ecological indicator selection and the high costs associated with 
their quantification, adoption rate has been the most widely used measure of success. Even though this 
measure overestimates programme achievements, as some of the outputs could have been obtained 
even in the absence of such policy (Smith and Weinberg, 2004), we consider that while further 
scientific and technological base is achieved, and taking for granted that policy design is efficient in so 
far requirements assure outputs, adoption rates are valid indicators. 
 
Therefore, further understanding of AES sign-up decisions by farmers is a key issue in order to 
increase agri-environmental policy effectiveness. This paper deepens in the theoretical model of 
farmer behaviour in the presence of AES by considering the effect of different factors depending on 
the intensity of the requirements for implementing a particular AES. Identifying the relevant factors 
influencing the adoption decision provides useful information for scheme design and implementation 
measures that increases sign-up probability. The rest of the paper is structured as follows: section II   3
presents a review of current knowledge regarding farmer AES adoption and develops a theoretical 
model adapted to test the research hypothesis. Section III includes a description of the AES selected 
for corroborating the theoretical hypothesis as well as the fieldwork undertaken and the estimated 
econometric model. Next, model estimation results are presented and section V provides a summary of 
the main findings and the policy recommendations derived thereof.  
 
 
II. Explaining the adoption of AES 
 
Factors affecting farmers’ individual decision to sign-up in AES can be grouped in four main 
categories (Vanslembrouck et al., 2002). Programme (type of measure, compensation paid, application 
costs, etc.) and market (food and environment demand) characteristics constitute the so-called 
extrinsic factors while farm (size, crop portfolio, etc.) and individual farmer (age, education, etc.) 
characteristics are intrinsic factors. As a distinctive component of intrinsic factors, special attention 
has been given to the effect of social capital, a concept which cannot be captured by a single definition 
(Coleman, 1988), however recurrently references to social capital involve social structures or networks 
which enhance certain actions, such as the adoption of technology or practice, trade, etc. 
 
Previous research has tested the effect of many of these variables on farmer participation in AES. 
Related to programme characteristics only participation in another AES can be tested as the rest of the 
attributes are homogenous for each set of farmers. The most significant factor affecting participation 
seems to be prior participation in similar schemes (Potter and Lobley, 1992; Morris and Potter, 1995; 
Wilson, 1997; Drake et al., 1999; Wilson and Hart, 2001) indicating that once a farmer has shifted its 
technology towards environmental goods provision, this condition tends to prevail in the long term as 
long as the scheme is maintained. Other programme characteristics that has been previously analysed 
empirically are payment levels (Delvaux et al., 1999; Van Huylenbroeck and Whitby, 1999; 
Vanslembrouck et al., 2002; Cooper, 2003; Wossink and Van Wenum, 2003) and contract duration 
(Wilson, 1997), while monitoring and targeting have been studied theoretically (Moxey et al., 1999; 
Fraser, 2002 and 2004), with special focus on risk aversion. Market characteristics, although described 
in many cases (i.e. Gómez-Limón and Atance, 2004) have not been considered in sign-up decisions as 
prices of inputs and outputs are considered homogenous for each AES modelled. 
 
As far as farmer individual characteristics are concerned, there is a wide consensus regarding 
increased participation of younger farmers (Morris and Potter, 1995, Bonnieux et al., 1998, Wilson 
and Hart, 2000; Mathijs, 2003; Vanslembrouck et al., 2002; Paniagua, 2001; Jongeneel et al., 2008). 
Nevertheless, when the AES is focused on extensification, older farmers are more prone to sign-up 
(Potter and Lobley, 1992; Drake et al., 1999) as this type of AES require less labour and does not 
request new investments either in capital and/or knowledge, which are the main reasons for deterring 
older farmers from participating. In this sense, in the evaluation of an extensification programme in 
Spain, Paniagua (2001) concludes that part-time farmers also tend to participate more often in 
programmes that require less involvement. The same conclusion has been obtained by Mathijs (2003) 
related to the willingness to adopt a countryside stewardship scheme in Belgium. In a research made 
by Jongeneel et al. (2008) on the adoption of different multifunctional activities by farmers in the 
Netherlands, having an outside job has a negative effect on participation in labour-intensive activities 
due to the fact that these leave less time available to participate in off-farm activities. However, an 
opposite and significant effect was found for participation in less labour-intensive measures.   4
Regarding farmer’s education, Delvaux et al. (1999) and Dupraz et al. (2000) confirm that a better 
understanding of the AES requirements or a higher environmental concern positively affect 
participation, while formal education is positively related to participation in studies undertaken by, 
Delvaux et al. (1999), Drake et al. (1999), Dupraz et al. (2000) and Wilson and Hart (2000). On the 
other hand, a minority of studies (Bonnieux et al., 1998; Jongeneel et al., 2008) reach the opposite 
conclusion although the former alerts of co linearity between education and farm size that may have 
distort the coefficients and the latter is justified by the fact that higher education levels imply higher 
opportunity costs of labour in other sectors. Related to education, we can also consider farmer’s 
attitudes towards the environment. Attitudes have been measured using several approaches (Morris 
and Potter, 1995; Bonnieux et al., 1998; Drake et al., 1999) but independently of the approach chosen, 
there is consensus regarding the positive relationship between participation and farmer’s positive 
attitude towards the environment. Attitudes towards risk can also have an impact on farmer 
participation, mainly due to income security assured by environmental payments (Fraser, 2004). 
Nevertheless, Slangen (1997) and Sumpsi et al. (1998) claim that uncertainty regarding the future of 
AES and the impact of practices in future production ability may hamper participation. Risk aversion 
has also been highlighted as a factor interacting with monitoring and penalty programme 
characteristics (Ozanne et al., 2001). An additional attitude that shows divergent effects on 
participation is that of innovativeness; although Willock et al. (1999) detect that pioneer farmers are 
participating more often in AES in Scotland, Wossink and Van Wenum (2003), do not find significant 
relationships between these two concepts by Dutch arable farmers in biodiversity conservation 
programmes, indicating that farmers associate participating in the existing conservation programmes 
with a traditional, non-innovative way of farming. Therefore, this influx is contingent on the degree of 
change the measure introduces into the farm management. 
 
Finally, farm characteristics also affect farmer participation in AES. The most important factors 
considered in previous studies include farm size, property regime and farmer’s succession. The latter 
factors provide divergent evidence regarding the influence on farmers’ uptake. As an example, size 
seems to affect positively participation in extensification programs (Morris and Potter, 1995; Wilson, 
1997; Paniagua, 2001), however in some specific programmes such as biodiversity conservation 
schemes seems to be negatively related with size (Siebert et al., 2006) and other authors find size not 
significant when analysing farmer participation in AES (Bonnieux et al., 1998; Wynn et al., 2001; 
Wossink and Van Wenum, 2003). A final component affecting participation and resulting from the 
interaction of the former four is “social capital” which results from the relationships between farmers, 
managing authorities, extension agencies and other farmers. These relationships foster information, 
dissemination and programme promotion that in turn results in higher enrolment. This hypothesis has 
been confirmed by the empirical research undertaken by Mathijs (2003) or Jongeneel et al. (2008) in 
different settings and for different AES.  
 
To sum up, and quoting the review of 160 AES studies undertaken by Siebert et al. (2006) “farmers’ 
decisions are the results of complex social and cultural interactions as well as of wider economic and 
programme design features” (pp.328). Our study will identify how far these prior findings apply for to 
marginal dry-land areas and programmes varying in requirement intensity. 
 
The conceptual model and the variables influencing their uptake described previously derive into a 
micro-economic modelling framework. Following Dupraz et al. (2003) such a model can be based on 
the assumption that farmers’ derived their utility mainly from three components, the economic benefit   5
(m), the provision of agri-environmental goods (v) and farmers’ individual characteristics (Z
U). Within 
those factors, a sub-component is defined to reflect farmers’ social capital characteristics (Z
SC). 
 
Farmers’ main objective is to maximize his utility (equation [1]), subject to two restrictions (equations 
[2] and [3]). The first restriction limits economic benefit as a result of the profit derived by agricultural 
production (a) and the AES participation (b), minus the transaction costs (c) derived from the 
implementation of the AES. Agricultural profit (
R π ) depends on the input and output market prices 
(p) and on the area signed-up under AES (v)
1 and the farm technical features (Z
π). AES participation is 
reflected as the AES premium ( ρ ) and the signed-up surface. Transaction Cost (TC)
2 is a function of 
Social Capital (Z
SC), as well as of farmer individual characteristics (Z
U)
3 and the contract 
characteristics (Z
C). All the variables belonging to this last category are homogenous for each AES and 
therefore cannot be tested. In addition, TC can also be influenced by technical specifications (Z
π). The 
second restriction (equation [3]) shows that the level of agri-environmental production receiving a 
compensation payment should be greater than a minimum level defined by the CAP
4.  
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The main contribution of this paper is to contrast the above stated hypothesis in two AES 
differentiated by the level of asset specificity. The basic assumption is that factors affecting 
participation will vary across AES. In AES with low asset specificity and no effect on the food and 
animal production, sign-up decision is hypothesized to be mainly driven by the effect associated with 
farmers’ utility function derived from farmers’ individual factors. On the other hand, for AES 
implying a more intensive change in the farm management, due for example to a change in the crop 
pattern, sign-up decision is hypothesised to be affected mainly by technical factors affecting the 
function derived from the profit forgone. For both measures, social capital should influence AES 
uptake due to a reduction on the transaction costs.  
 
Some studies have identified relationships between practices required by AES and farmers’ intrinsic 
factors. Vanslembrouck et al. (2002) modelled hypothetical participation in two AES differentiated by 
the farmers’ effort to comply with the measure as well as the utility derived from applying the AES. 
Results showed a significant difference of factors influencing participation derived from the divergent 
nature of the measures. Differences related to farmers’ characteristics were detected by Jongeneel et 
al. (2008) evaluating farmers’ participation in different multifunctional activities in agriculture. De 
Francesco et al. (2007) analyse farmer participation in three types of measures, one of them defined as 
low input, however no clear distinction between measures was concluded. Finally, Ducos and Dupraz 
                                                 
1 The model assumes that the land profitability enrolled and not enrolled in the AES differs. 
2 Hobbs (2004) defines TC as: search costs arising ex ante to the transaction, negotiation costs arising during the 
transaction and monitoring and enforcement costs occurring ex-post transactions. 
3 It should be mentioned that this effect is difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish in an econometric sense, 
from the effect these variables have on the farmers utility parameter. 
4 Under current CAP regulation, these restrictions are defined by cross-compliance requirements which are 
compulsory for all farmers receiving the Single Farm Payment.   6
(2007) focused their research on the effect of TC for different AES signs-up. Results showed that 
factors related to proxies associated with a lack of trust and uncertainty had a significant negative 
effect on the probability of farmers choosing more demanding practices. 
 
 
III. Case study 
 
III.1. Selected agri-environmental schemes 
 
Two AES with different levels of requirements have been selected to test the theoretical framework 
sketched above; the environmental fallow (EFM) and the alternative crops in special protected areas 
(ACM) measures. EFM can be seen as a clear example of a low requirement measure while ACM 
represents a more intensive measure with regards to farm management changes. Table 1 reflects both 
measure’s main characteristics.  
 
Table 1. Selected AES main characteristics.  
  Eligibility 
EFM    Farm located in an area with fallow index >10  
  Minimum uptake surface 1 ha. 
ACM 
  Farm with non-irrigated COP declared surface for 99-00 campaign 
  25% of enrolled plots limiting forest area 
  Farm located in municipalities compromising Natura 2000 Sites 
  Requirements 
EFM 
  Implementing a farm management plan 
  Keeping stubble on the field until next sowing 
  Use of phytosanitary products during the no-cultivation period restricted 
  Livestock load restricted to 80% of GAP (1 LSU ha
-1) 
  Chop and leave straw on the field on at least 50% of fallow surface 
  Livestock grazing on stubble areas limited to 3 months 
ACM 
  Implementing a farm management plan 
  Cultivate Alfalfa maintaining the vegetable part of the plant green in summer 
  Harvesting and/or grazing forbidden from 31/VIII to 15/IX 
  For farm-holds with livestock: belonging to veterinary control group 
  Conventional and in favour of slope ploughing forbidden 
  Maximum of 10% cereal allowed in pulse crops fields 
  Compensation 
EFM    60.13 €.ha
-1 
ACM    102.00 €. ha
-1 
  Environmental benefit 
EFM    Enhance steppe bird population (increase feed and winter habitat; reduce mortality)  
ACM    Reduce fire risk and increase nitrogen soil content 
Source: BOE (2002); BOA (2005) and own elaboration.  
 
The EFM implies little, if any, additional requirements to traditional dry-land cereal management in 
marginal areas as the compulsory fallow index already imposes leaving 50% of total area uncultivated, 
hence there is no additional production loss. The only additional requirement is chopping and leaving 
the straw on the field, but this task can be easily outsourced and the payment nearly doubles estimated   7
costs for this task. Thus, the EFM can be characterised as a low requirement and low asset-specificity 
measure. On the other hand, the ACM can be considered a high asset-specificity measure due to the 
change in the crop pattern that requires additional know-how and important opportunity costs due to 
the loss of cereal surface for cereal oriented farms, however once the crop change has been undertaken 
it can be classified as a low effort demanding measure. 
 
III.2.Sample selection and questionnaire  
 
Fieldwork has been undertaken in two regions were the AES were in place in 2006 and 2007 
respectively. The EFM survey was administrated to cereal farmers in three counties in Andalusia 
(Southern Spain) while ACM was undertaken in three counties in Aragón (Northern Spain). In both 
cases, farmers interviewed had to be eligible for the AES under consideration and sample size was 
allocated discretionally to over-represent enrolled farmers. Actual uptake rate for EFM and ACM was 
15.9% and 2.8% of total eligible farm holds respectively while for both samples 40% of surveys were 
addressed to enrolled farmers (see Table 2). 
 
Table 2. Sample size distribution figures 
Signed up  Non signed up  Total   
Population Sample Population Sample Population Sample 
EFM  388  120 2,445  180 2,833  300 
ACM  107  62 3,838  94 3,945  156 
TOTAL  495  182 6,283  274 6,778  456 
Source: Own calculations based on 1999 agricultural census and AES monitoring reports. 
 
For EFM, a total of 300 farmers have been interviewed, this sample size represents 33% of total 
programme signups in the study area. Fieldwork was conducted during June-August 2006. The 
questionnaire was designed by the research team after a thorough review of previous research, 
agricultural structure in the area and interviews with the AES managing authority. An initial version 
was field tested with 5 farmers for comprehension before generating the final version. Farmers were 
randomly selected from the population in each strata (enrolled / non-enrolled farmers by municipality) 
and interviewed in their homes by two agronomists trained by the research team; average interview 
time was 45 minutes. The ACM questionnaire was a redesigned and an improved version of the EFM 
taking into account the differences between both AES. The survey was conducted during the period 
April-June 2007 by a market research company that employed interviewers with agronomic 
background and trained in situ by the research team. Due to the smaller number of farmers enrolled in 
the ACM, sample size was reduced to 156. All farmers enrolled and accessible
5 were selected for 
interviewing, while non-enrolled farmers were randomly selected from the different municipalities 
according to the overall percentage of farmers. 
 
                                                 
5 Differences between total sign-ups and sample size are due to same farm-hold applying for more than one 
contract (2 cases), contact data not facilitated by the managing authority (36 cases) or farmer not willing to 
participate in the survey (7 cases).    8
The questionnaire used gathered data regarding three main topics: a) farm basic data with special 




III.3. Econometric model 
 
To test the hypothesis put forward in section II, a discrete choice model is fitted to explain farmers’ 
adoption decision. The outcome of the discrete model is the reflection on an underlying regression that 
models the benefit from contracting the first hectare, the latent variable in the probit model. This 
variable is derived from the marginal profit which is contingent on AES premium, change in profit due 
AES requirements, marginal rate of substitution between utility derived from environmental goods and 








b − + + = π ρ   [4]   
 
Where b is the latent variable reflecting the marginal profit of adoption, ρ the AES premium, 
R
v π the 
forgone agricultural profit due to AES adoption,  v TC the transaction costs associated with AES 
adoption and Um and Uv the partial derivates of farmer’s utility with respect to income and 
environmental services provision respectively. Equations [5] and [6] show the discrete choice 
modelling framework.  
 
i i i u x b + + = β α   [5]   













Y   [6]   
 
Where yi is a binary variable reflecting whether the farmer has enrolled in the AES or not, xi are the 
independent variables reflecting the farm and farmers’ characteristics, and β are the estimated model 
coefficients (including a constant, α). The parameters  σ β /  are estimated by the maximum likelihood 
estimator as OLS (Ordinary Least Square) estimates are biased due to heterodasticity and non-
normality distribution of residuals (Cramer, 1991). The observed variable (Yi), takes the value 1 when 
the latent variable is positive and 0 when is negative. The probability of contracting is defined as 
) ( ) 0 ( σ
β x b P ′ Φ = ≥  with  Φ being the cumulative function of the normal distribution and σ  its 
standard deviation. The variables affecting the enrolment decision and their signs will be used to test 





Variables included in the adoption models grouped by concept they measure and with expected signs 
for both AES considered are described in Table 3. The questionnaire included many more variables 
                                                 
6 Both questionnaires are available upon request to the authors.    9
that could measure these concepts but this table only reports those that show the best statistical fit for 
the data.  
 
Table 3. Variables included in the estimated models 
Expected sign 
Concept Variable  Definition  EFM ACM 
LSU-PER-HA  Livestock units per hectare  - + 
LSU  Presence of cattle in the farm-hold (1 if yes)  - + 
NON-IRR-CEREAL  Crop distribution includes no-irrigated cereal (1 if yes)  ? - 
IRR-CEREAL Crop  distribution  includes irrigated cereal (1 if yes)  ? - 
INSURANCE  Farm has contracted agricultural insurance (1 if yes)  ? ? 
IRR-ALFALFA Farm  irrigated  pulse crop surface (has.)  ? + 
NON-I-ALFALFA-00  Farm already had pulse crops before AES (1 if yes)  o + 
HARVESTER  Farm owns harvester (1 if yes)  ? - 
Z
π 
MARKET  Farmer plans to sell/rent the farm when retiring (1 if yes)  ? - 
FARMER-UNION  Farmer is a member of farmers union (1 if yes)  + + 
ADD-INF-SOUR  Farmer uses more than one source for technical advice (1 
if yes)  + + 
INF-AES-FINEN  Farmer obtains information related to AES from financial 
entities (1 if yes)   + + 
Z
SC 
INF-TECH-UNION  Farmer obtains technical advice from farmer unions (1 if 
yes)  + + 
AGE  Farmer’s age (years)  ? ? 
EDUCATION Farmer  formal  educational level (4-point scale)  + + 
INCOME  Farm income per capita (€ /year)  ? ? 
FUT_IRRIG  Prob. of new irrigation plans being undertaken (1 if 
declared probability > average probability)  - - 
INNOVATION  Farmer attitude towards policies implying changes in farm 




POS-ENV-IMPACT  Environmental impact of dry-land cereal management in 
farm (4-point increasing scale towards positive impact)  + + 
Z
c  OTHER-AES  Farmer participates in other AES (1 if yes)  + + 
+: positive sign expected; -: negative sign expected; o: question not included in the questionnaire; ?:no a priory 
sign expected 
 
Table 4 presents the final models estimated for both AES. For the estimates presented only farmers 
declaring that they knew the existence of the AES have been considered due to data issues
7. Technical 
variables play a minor role for the EFM adoption as expected. The only significant variable is related 
to the interaction between cereal and livestock production, moreover this variable could be partly 
endogenous, as farmers might have reduced their livestock density in order to comply with the AES 
requirements prior to signing up. On the other hand, up to eight technical variables explain the 
adoption choice in the ACM. These variables can be grouped to reflect three main vectors affecting 
the sign up decision: a) cereal specialisation, b) pulse crop management know-how and c) land market 
value. The first vector is represented by four variables (IRR-CER; NON-IRR-CER; HARVESTER 
and INSURANCE) that characterize farms with a strong focus on cereal production and consequently 
lower marginal costs associated with this crop. These farms would face higher forgone profits in the 
AES signed up area (
R
v π ) and higher transaction costs due to the opportunity cost of the investment 
associated with the harvester
8, thus they should be less willing to participate as shown by the results. 
                                                 
7 A basic premise is that in order to take a decision regarding adopting an AES farmers need to be aware of the 
measure. However, 16.6% of the total sample for EFM (50 cases) and 33.3% for ACM (52 cases) declared not 
knowing the existence of the studied AES and have been discarded from the reported models.  
8 Harvesters are not used for pulse crops.   10
Agricultural insurance in the area is mainly focused on cereal production and in this case is considered 
as a proxy of farm dependence on cereal income, with farmers being more prone to insure cereal 
production as their dependency on this crop increases.  
 
Table 4. AES adoption models results 
  EFM ACM 
Concept Variable  β   S.d. P-value  β   S.d. P-value 
  α  -3.474 0.833  0.0000  0.368  1.145  0.7480 
LSU-PER-HA -0.558  0.363  0.0937       
LSU      1.021  0.385  0.0079 
NON-IRR-CEREAL       -1.034 0.565  0.0672 
IRR-CEREAL       -1.254  0.475  0.0083 
INSURANCE       -1.788  0.876  0.0413 
IRR-ALFALFA      0.057  0.028  0.0393 
NON-I-ALFALFA-00      0.966  0.406  0.0172 
HARVESTER       -2.078  1.221  0.0961 
Z
π 
MARKET       -1.079  0.464  0.0200 
FARMER-UNION 0.705  0.189  0.0002       
ADD-INF-SOURCE 0.872  0.372 0.0190       
INF-AES-FINEN 0.421  0.187  0.0245  1.770 0.763  0.0204 
Z
SC 
INF-TECH-UNION      1.123  0.508  0.0269 
AGE 0.032  0.010  0.0019       
EDUCATION 0.263  0.127  0.0381       
INCOME -0.650  0.281  0.0207       
FUT_IRRIG 0.365  0.205  0.0748  -0.190  0.081  0.0186 




POS-ENV-IMPACT      0.589  0.237  0.0129 
Z
c  OTHER-AES      0.623  0.391  0.1111 
  Number of observations = 250 
-2log likelihood null = 344.635 
-2log likelihood model = 287.916 
χ
2= 56.719 p-value= 0.000 
Mc_Fadden R
2 = 0.1646 
% of correct predictions = 70.4 % (64.0% applicants/ 
75.7 % non-applicants) 
Number of observations = 104 
-2log likelihood null = 140.304 
-2log likelihood model = 66.424 
χ
2= 73.878 p-value= 0.000 
Mc_Fadden R
2 = 0.5266 
% of correct predictions = 85.6 % 
(90.3% applicants/ 78.6 % non-
applicants) 
 
The second vector is represented by three variables (IRR-ALFALFA; NON-IR-ALFALFA00 and 
LSU). The first two variables would decrease TC associated with the measure due to farmer already 
possessing management knowledge for the required crop. The last variable would decrease forgone 
profit as the farmer would use the new crop as pasture for the farm-hold livestock (mainly sheep). The 
final vector (MARKET) is associated with an increase forgone profit due to lower land value when 
retiring. If land has long-term commitments its price and sell/rent probability will be lower as uses are 
restricted.  
 
As expected, social capital variables are significant for both measures. Social capital variables used in 
the models refer to its structural form that reflects connectedness between stakeholders involved in the 
implementation of the AES (Woodhouse, 2006). Increased social activity, measured by belonging to 
farmers’ unions (FARMER-UNION) or information-gathering activities (use of social networks), 
reduce transaction costs associated with uncertainty regarding AES implications and/or farm 
management. A significant effect is associated with the role of financial entities in promoting AES 
adoption (INF-AES-FINEN), a characteristic which has not been reflected in any other study of AES   11
sign-up and which might not be related to environmental benefits but by the amount of subsidies that 
are channelled through these entities. 
 
Socio-demographics characteristics play a role on the EFM measure (AGE; EDUCATION; 
INCOME). As previously detected for low-requirement measures (Potter and Lobley, 1992; Drake et 
al., 1999), older farmers show a higher probability of participating due to easiness in implementing the 
requirements. In this particular case, EFM could be described as “traditional farm management” and 
therefore, older farmers were already following these requirements. Increasing levels of education 
have been detected as one of the drivers of EAS adoption due to a better understanding of measure 
requirements and implications’, this seems to be the case for the EFM. The negative impact of income 
would be related to low, if any, forgone profits associated with measure implementation and the 
assurance of a steady income independent of climatic and market risks. As expected, farmer socio-
demographics play no role for the more demanding measure, where technical variables limit their 
effect. Farmers’ attitudes affect the sign-up decision for both measures and thus can be considered 
independent of the measure intensity of change. Expecting future transformation (FUT-IRR) into 
irrigation is expected to have a negative effect on adoption due to an increase opportunity costs. 
Unexpected negative influence is found for the EFM where traditional fallow is not compulsory when 
irrigation is available; however, as no investment is needed to undertake this measure, there are no 
sunk costs associated with breaking the contract if transformation into irrigation is undertaken. The 
positive sign for ACM does reflect the potential drawback when converting the land to irrigation due 
to the change in crop pattern. Higher environmental awareness (POS-ENV-MAN) is considered to be 
related to a higher utility derived from the implementation of the AES and therefore its positive sign 
reflects an increase of farmer’s utility when signing-up for ACM.  
 
V.  Summary and policy implications 
 
The main finding reported in this paper is the diminishing role of farm technical characteristics as AES 
become less asset specific. ACM sign-up decision is strongly influenced by farm technical features 
(Z
π), while farmer individual variables (Z
U) play a more important role explaining participation in a 
low-asset specificity measure (EFM). This corroborates the validity of the theoretical framework 
presented to evaluate agri-environmental policy. Nevertheless, two groups of variables play a role for 
both types of measures: social capital and farmers’ attitudes. Both groups are interlinked as attitudes 
can be changed though enhanced social capital (Pretty and Smith, 2004). Additionally, social capital 
could play a role in increasing the AES awareness and thus expanding the base of potential adopters.  
 
Policy recommendations for AES design stem directly from the above-reported findings. If AES is to 
be geared towards very specific measures, then participatory design with farmers and/or their 
representatives should be a must. Measures should be technically feasible for existing farms as, if not, 
although environmental benefits can be achieved according to the design specifications, farmers’ 
uptake will be very limited. If less demanding AES are promoted, then targeting those farmers more 
willing to participate should be the area in which additional efforts would provide higher yields. 
Although recommendations can vary from case to case, our data seem to support promoting 
extensification as a pre-abandonment and income support option for older farmers with lower 
incomes.  
For both cases increasing the social networks in rural areas is a win-win scenario. Apart from the 
knowledge effect mentioned above, increased SC promotes AES adoption either by reducing   12
transaction costs or by directly influencing on farmers’ utility functions. Nevertheless, social capital 
quality should also be taken into account. The impact of financial entities in sign-up does not assure 
enhanced environmental awareness by farmers and reinforces the risk of the end of contract dilemma 
(Whitby, 2000), when environmental benefits might be at risk when other production options are 
available (i.e. higher food and fibre prices and thus higher forgone profits). Further research should be 
geared towards increasing the understanding of interactions between the different components 
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